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On June 15th, 2011, a hockey riot occurred in Vancouver, British Columbia. This event is prominent in 
Canada’s history for, among other reasons, the unprecedented extent to which it was documented via 
photographs and video footage. The days that followed the riot saw much of this media documentation 
uploaded to social media platforms on the Internet, where Internet users worked together to identify and 
collectively “name and shame” those believed to have been involved in the disturbance. Several 
individuals targeted by these “Internet vigilantes” were young offenders whose identities are legally 
protected from publication under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). This article examines the 
phenomenon of “Internet vigilantism”, and raises the issue of whether those provisions within the YCJA 
that prohibit the identification of youth remain relevant today, given the current difficulties in enforcing 
these provisions. Following an overview of these “secrecy provisions”, the phenomenon of Internet 
vigilantism is defined, and challenges posed by acts of Internet vigilantism are discussed.  A “naming 
and shaming” Facebook group created for the purpose of identifying participants in the 2011 Vancouver 
riot is then looked to as a case study of Internet vigilantism in action. This article concludes with 
recommendations for how justice officials and social media outlets may modify current practices to 
better protect the safety and security of young offenders, and to minimize harmful instances of Internet 
vigilantism. 
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Le 15 juin 2011, une émeute liée au hockey s’est déroulée à Vancouver, en Colombie-Britannique. Cet 
événement est important dans l’histoire du Canada, entre autres raisons, pour sa documentation sans 
précédent par l’entremise de photographies et de séquences vidéos. Les jours qui ont suivi l’émeute, une 
grande quantité d’information médiatique a été téléchargée sur les médias sociaux, où des internautes 
collaboraient afin d’identifier et de « nommer et pointer du doigt » ces personnes qui auraient participé 
aux troubles sociaux. Plusieurs individus ciblés par ces « justiciers de l’Internet » étaient de jeunes 
contrevenants dont l’identité est légalement protégée contre la publication en vertu de la Loi sur le 
système de justice pénale pour les adolescents (LSJPA). Cet article se penche sur le phénomène des « 
justiciers de l’Internet » et s’interroge sur la pertinence actuelle des dispositions dans le cadre de la 
LSJPA qui interdisent l’identification des jeunes, étant donné les difficultés présentes à faire respecter 
ces dispositions. Après un aperçu de ces « dispositions relatives au secret », le phénomène des justiciers 
de l’Internet est défini, et les défis posés par leurs actions sont discutés. Le groupe Facebook qui visait à 
« nommer et pointer du doigt » les participants de l’émeute de 2011 de Vancouver est présenté ici 
comme une étude de cas sur les justiciers de l’Internet. Cet article formule des recommandations sur la 
façon dont les fonctionnaires de la justice et les médias sociaux peuvent modifier les pratiques courantes 
afin de mieux protéger la sécurité des jeunes délinquants et réduire au minimum les effets nuisibles 
découlant des actions des justiciers de l’Internet. 
 




















On June 15th 2011, British Columbia's National Hockey League Team, the Vancouver Canucks, 
played their seventh and final game of the Stanley Cup Finals against the Boston Bruins. The 
Canucks’ loss against the Bruins was followed by one of the most destructive and memorable riots 
in the city’s history. Of the thousands of photographs taken by bystanders that night, one of the 
most iconic remains that of Nathan Kotylak, a 17-year-old former star athlete, seemingly attempting 
to light a police car on fire. The photograph was published online almost immediately following 
the riot, where it was shared innumerable times on various Internet social media sites. Within hours, 
Kotylak was identified by users on the social media website Facebook (Schneider & Trottier, 2012). 
The backlash he suffered from the public shortly after was immediate, merciless, and 
overwhelmingly public. As the photograph continued to make its way across the Internet, Kotylak 
found himself subjected to a torrent of verbal abuse, demands for punishment, and threats, until 
eventually he and his family were forced to flee their home following the publication of their home 
address online (Ryan, 2012). To this day, an Internet search of Kotylak’s full name yields pages 
upon pages of news articles and blog posts devoted to vilifying him.  
The unrelenting “naming and shaming” that Nathan Kotylak was subjected to following the 
2011 Vancouver riot exemplifies a relatively recent and little understood phenomenon that has been 
described as “cyber vigilantism”, “digitalism”, or more commonly, “Internet vigilantism” (Juliano, 
2011; Wehmhoener, 2010). Internet vigilantism raises a number of concerns pertaining to the 
overlapping realms of privacy, free speech, and criminal law – and online “naming and shaming”, 
in particular, raises concerns regarding the enforceability of provisions within the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act that intend to prevent the publication of young offenders’ names in any sort of public 
media. Though the consequences of violating a publication ban mandated by the Act are serious, 
these provisions are gradually becoming more difficult to enforce, as the Internet increasingly 
enables users to easily sidestep these laws. 
Nathan Kotylak’s experience does not signify the first instance in which young offenders 
have been identified online and made targets for subsequent public naming and shaming. Almost 
four years earlier, on January 1 2008, 14-year-old Stefanie Rengel was murdered by David 
Bagshaw in Toronto, Ontario, after being stabbed repeatedly in the stomach on the sidewalk near 
her home. The murder was reportedly orchestrated by Bagshaw’s girlfriend, 15-year-old Melissa 
Todorovic, who had pressured Bagshaw into committing the murder when she began to see Rengel 
as a rival and grew jealous (Jones, 2013). Rengel was a popular and well-liked student at her school, 
and despite strong efforts on the part of justice officials and police to protect both her identity and 
the identities of the accused, a Facebook group was soon established for the purpose of mourning 
her death. Many angry and frustrated Facebook users posted to the group with the intention of 
publicizing the identities of Bagshaw and Todorovic; others did so imploring that they be tried as 
adults for the murder (Pallanik, 2008). 
This case is merely one of many that, in recent years, have brought to the attention of justice 
officials the numerous difficulties involved in protecting the identities of young offenders on the 
Internet. The unprecedented magnitude of the Internet vigilantism that followed the 2011 
Vancouver riot, in particular, urges us to reassess how secrecy provisions for young offenders can 
be enforced in a “Facebook age”  – if, indeed, they can be enforced at all. This short paper addresses 
the phenomenon of Internet vigilantism and the problems it poses for the safety and privacy of 
those targeted by it, particularly when those targeted are young offenders whose identities are 













the Youth Criminal Justice Act that prohibit the publication of young offenders’ names in all but 
exceptional circumstances, then turn to an exploration of the motivating factors behind Internet 
vigilantism. Next follows a discussion of the Internet vigilantism that followed the 2011 Vancouver 
riot, and a brief examination of the posts made to a particularly popular “naming and shaming” 
Facebook group created soon after the event. Based on the content of these posts, preliminary 
recommendations are offered for how both justice officials and social media websites may modify 
current practices and policies to better protect the safety and privacy of sensitive individuals, 
including youth.  
 
The Youth Criminal Justice Act and the Logic of Publication Bans 
 
The Youth Criminal Justice Act (hereby referred to as the YCJA) is the law that governs Canada’s 
youth justice system. It replaced the Young Offenders Act when it came into effect on April 1 2003, 
and covers the prosecution of youths at least 12 years of age but under 18 years old for criminal 
offences. One of the many ways in which the YCJA is distinguished from the Young Offenders Act 
- and its predecessor, the Juvenile Delinquents Act - is through its prohibition of the publication of 
information that would identify youth accused of committing criminal acts, as well as youth who 
have been victims of crime (Department of Justice Canada, 2013b). The provisions outlining how 
and when this general publication ban is to be enforced are contained within s. 110 and s. 111 of 
the YCJA: 
110. (1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young 
person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify 
the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.  
[…] 
111. (1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or 
young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it 
would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having 
appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to 
have been committed by a young person. 
This publication ban is justified on the basis that publicizing information pertaining to the 
identity of a young offender has the potential to be so stigmatizing and harmful in its consequences 
that it can hinder the youth’s eventual rehabilitation. This logic is in accordance with the YCJA’s 
Declaration of Principle (contained within s. 3), which states that a primary goal of Canada’s 
juvenile justice system must be, above all else, the reintegration of young offenders into society 
through rehabilitative and preventative channels wherever possible. This, in turn, is based on the 
premise that youth are more immature than adults, and thus typically possess greater outlooks for 
rehabilitation; it is this same logic that also informs the fundamental need for juvenile justice 
legislation separate from that of adults. Barring a number of exceptional circumstances under which 
such a ban may be lifted, breaking a publication ban imposed on a young person is a serious 
criminal offence. The publication of information which may reveal the identity of a young person, 
victim, or witness can carry a penalty of up to two years in custody (Department of Justice Canada, 
2013b). 
Within the YCJA, publication is defined as the communication of information by making it 
known or accessible to the general public “by any means” – including through print, radio, 













YCJA are typically interpreted to include within the scope of “publications” the posting of 
identifying information on social media outlets, in accordance with the Act’s intentions 
(Department of Justice Canada, 2013a). However, the legal issues that surround these 
interpretations remain highly complicated, which subsequently limits their enforceability (Powell 
& Mitchell, 2008). There is still no consensus, for example, as to whether all user pages created on 
the social media website “Facebook” are to be treated as “publications”, since the website grants 
users a large amount of control over the individual privacy settings of all posted content. 
Additionally, whether or not individual Facebook pages are indexed by search engines such as 
Google is also contingent on users’ self-established privacy levels, which can be set to limit search 
engines' access. A further concern that has yet to be resolved is the fact that Facebook is an 
American site outside of Canadian legal jurisdiction, raising jurisdictional questions pertaining to 
whether, and when, Canadian publication bans against naming young offenders and victims would 
even apply (Millar, 2008). These numerous difficulties in policing the domain of the Internet have 
led to a number of public discussions as to whether the YCJA’s “secrecy provisions” still have 
relevance today (see Millar, 2008; Powell & Mitchell, 2008; Shanoff, 2011).  
 
Naming, Shaming, and Internet Vigilantism 
 
“Vigilante justice” describes the undertaking of any number of acts of law enforcement without 
legal authority. Though vigilantism is a well-documented and recognizable phenomenon, 
definitions and conceptualizations as to exactly what kinds of acts constitute vigilante justice are 
varied (Juliano, 2011; Wehmhoener, 2010). Johnston’s (1996, p. 220) highly versatile definition is 
employed for this paper, which identifies acts of vigilantism according to six key characteristics: 
1. It involves planning and premeditation by those engaging in it; 
2. Its participants are private citizens whose engagement is voluntary; 
3. It is a form of autonomous citizenship and as such, constitutes a social movement; 
4. It uses or threatens the use of force; 
5. It arises when established order is under threat from the transgression, the potential 
transgression, or the imputed transgression of institutionalized norms; 
6. It aims to control crime or other social infractions by offering assurances (or ‘guarantees’) 
of security both to the participants and to others. 
 “Internet vigilantism” shares many, and often all, of these characteristics, and thus may be 
defined as vigilante justice that occurs in the domain, or with the aid, of the Internet. There are 
many different forms which Internet vigilantism may take, but it is “naming and shaming” that 
arguably raises the most concerns regarding the enforceability of publication bans and the 
protection of youths’ privacy. This term refers to the identification of perceived wrongdoers and, 
in the absence of traditional means by which to inflict physical harm, the subsequent infliction of 
shame or harassment upon them (Wehmhoener, 2010). 
Arguably all acts of vigilante justice create risks for both justice officials and the general 
public, and those created by the actions of Internet vigilantes are no different. Because vigilantism 
is typically engaged in by individuals not affiliated with the formal justice system, punishments 
may be vastly disproportionate to crimes, acts of vigilantism may interfere with or impede attempts 
on the part of the formal justice system to bring offenders to justice, and - perhaps of most concern 
- the wrong individual may be targeted (Huey et al., 2013; Johnston, 1996; Wehmhoener, 2010). 













traditional forms of vigilantism, because of how difficult the domain of the Internet is to police. 
Following Stefanie Rengel’s murder, for example, police and Facebook staff made numerous 
attempts to comply with the YCJA by deleting posts which identified Rengel and/or her killers, but 
ultimately could not put a permanent stop to the republishing of the deleted information by 
individual users (Pallanik, 2008).  
Much of the difficulty of policing acts of Internet vigilantism stems from the same reasons 
it holds appeal in the first place: The nature of the Internet allows users to remain anonymous with 
ease (see Torrevillas, 2011; Wehmhoener, 2010). Several classic studies on the effects of 
anonymity have found it to play a key role in enabling antinormative and criminal behaviours 
(Cannavale, Scarr & Pepitone, 1970; Kiesler, Siegel and McGuire, 1984; Mann, 1981; Mathes and 
Guest, 1976), as well as in increasing aggression (Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon, & Ditrichs, 
1972; Mathes & Kahn, 1975; Page & Moss, 1976). These patterns have been observed in recent 
studies on computer-mediated communication as well: Santana (2014), for example, found that 
Internet comments posted anonymously were more frequently “uncivil” compared to comments 
posted nonanonymously, while other studies have identified positive relationships between 
anonymity and cyberbullying (Barlett; 2013; Moore, Nakano, Enomoto, & Suda, 2012) and 
anonymity and “cyber-aggression” (Wright, 2013, 2014; Zimmerman & Ybarra, 2014), 
respectively. Consistent with deindividuation theories, these findings suggest that those who 
engage in Internet vigilantism may often be law-abiding individuals who, with the aid of the 
Internet, are empowered to behave in ways contrary to that of how they would in the “real world” 
(see Suler, 2004). 
On a much broader societal level, the “naming and shaming” of those who commit crimes is 
not an unfamiliar justice practice. It is typically justified by supporters on the basis that such tactics 
not only deter offenders from reoffending, but prevent crime at the general societal level as well 
through “setting an example” for others (see Golash, 2013). Though the logic of this approach is 
appealing in its simplicity, it does not appear to translate well into practice: In the United Kingdom, 
the breach rate for youth who receive Anti-social Behavior Orders (ASBOs) – and, subsequently, 
have both their orders and identities publicized - is significantly higher than that for adults who 
receive similar orders (UK Ministry of Justice, as cited in Crofts & Witzleb, 2013). Additional 
research suggests that “naming and shaming” tactics that result in stigmatizing labels for offenders 
can affect future access to conventional opportunities (Bernburg & Krohn, 2003; De Li, 1999; 
Lanctôt, Cernkovich, & Giordano, 2007), as well as increase the likelihood of rejection by 
conventional peers (Bernberg, Krohn, & Rivera, 2006). Furlong and Keefe (2011, p. 123), in their 
comprehensive review of the 2011 Vancouver riot, also acknowledge that practicing “naming and 
shaming” towards riot participants may punish them to the detriment of their rehabilitation: 
 
Many young people break the law. Not many years ago if a person was not caught 
by the police, prosecuted, and convicted, there would be no record of it. And, if 
there was, it would be sealed. Today a young person, perhaps with the help of the 
stranger cheering his antics, can create his own criminal record – one that cannot 
be expunged – to dog him for the rest of his life.  
 
Indeed, as increasingly more people share their experiences with having been the targets of 
online “naming and shaming”, the consequences of this practice are revealed as particularly 
devastating for the “offender” when they occur on the largely-unregulated domain of the Internet - 













personal contact information for harassment purposes (Tan, 2008), to the near-total destruction of 
one’s personal and professional reputation (Ronson, 2015). Based on these accounts, Internet 
vigilantism, and “naming and shaming” in particular, can be understood as akin to convicting and 
sentencing an individual to life in a virtual jail – one with no rules, regulations, or protection from 
abuse. 
 
“Vancouver Riot Pics: Post your Photos”: Internet Vigilantism in Action 
 
The 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup riot is a unique example of Internet vigilantism in action. What 
distinguished this riot from other major criminal events in Canada’s history – including a hockey 
riot that took place in downtown Vancouver in 1994, under very similar circumstances (Furlong & 
Keefe, 2011) – was how prominently the Internet, and social media in particular, featured in the 
community’s response to the disturbance. 
To gather evidence and apprehend those who participated in the riot, an enormous effort was 
made on the part of the Integrated Riot Investigation Team (IRIT) to secure the cooperation of the 
public, primarily through encouraging the submission of photographic and video evidence from the 
night of the riot. In addition to printing out flyers bearing the faces of alleged rioters for the purposes 
of distributing to the public, a website was set up immediately following the riot to allow those 
with evidence to upload it directly to police. This highly novel evidence-gathering strategy has been 
described by Schneider and Trottier (2012) as “crowdsourced policing”. Coined by Jeff Howe 
(2008, as cited in Schneider & Trottier, 2012), “crowdsourcing” is a term now typically used to 
refer to the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from 
a large group of people (most typically, an online community); “crowdsourced policing” may thus 
describe the soliciting of “pseudo-police work” from individuals not affiliated with law 
enforcement. This tactic proved extremely advantageous to the IRIT’s investigation: By October 
31 2011, the IRIT had managed to process “over 30 terabytes of data” and “over 5,000 hours of 
video” (Schneider & Trottier, 2013), with so much evidence sent to police on June 16 2011 - the 
day following the riot - that the website temporarily crashed (Vancouver Police Department, 2011).  
As these investigative efforts on the part of the IRIT took place, citizen-led efforts to 
“crowdsource” justice began to spring up simultaneously on a number of social media platforms. 
In the mere hours that followed the riot, public Facebook groups with names such as “[the] 
Vancouver Riot Wall of Shame”, “Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos”, and “Report Canuck 
RIOT Morons” were set up to enable and encourage those present at the riot to upload photographs, 
videos, and any other evidence incriminating to alleged rioters (Arvanitidis, 2013; Robinson, Kane, 
Duggan, & Law, 2011). Consistent with the IRIT’s goals, the stated intent of these groups was to 
expose rioters in a public venue in order to coerce them to turn themselves in (and, later, to assist 
the IRIT in their investigative efforts). Yet almost immediately, many who joined the groups took 
to using their public nature to simply “name and shame” alleged rioters through insults, humiliating 
remarks, and even threats. In some instances, acts of “naming and shaming” escalated to the point 
that highly personal information pertaining to alleged rioters, such as phone numbers, home 
addresses, and the names of family members, were published online, leading to some suspects – 
including Nathan Kotylak - being personally harassed and threatened by strangers (Finch, 
McIntyre, & Sundberg, 2012; Robinson et al., 2011).  
“Crowdsourced policing”, as described above, is not an entirely novel approach to crime 
control. The distribution of “wanted” posters, for example, illustrates an early version of this tactic; 













information that could lead to the prosecution of criminal suspects (Cavender & Bond-Maupin 
1993; Fishman & Cavender 1998). However, the widespread availability of portable devices 
capable of capturing photo and video, coupled with the sudden popularity of social media 
technologies and culture, have revolutionized the ease with which police evidence-gathering work 
may be “crowdsourced” today (Powell & Mitchell, 2008; Robinson et al., 2011). The fundamental 
structure of social media platforms such as Facebook, Tumblr, and Twitter enable users to 
document and disseminate information about global events with unprecedented ease and speed. 
User accounts on these sites are enormous repositories of potentially incriminating information, 
and the semi-public nature of these platforms allow for the relatively easy publication of said 
information - including by accident - from an individual profile to a public group. The 
dissemination of users’ personal information is further enabled by the networked structure of these 
sites, which easily allows users to both access others’ personal information, and distribute that 
information to a large number of individuals. Even further, users do not need to follow any 
particular criminal justice protocol in order to distribute information, thus allowing incriminating 
information to be shared almost immediately; in fact, many individuals who took part in the riot 
were being identified and shamed online even while the riot was still taking place (Schneider & 
Trottier, 2012, 2013). 
Schneider and Trottier’s (2012, 2013) qualitative examinations of user responses to the 2011 
Vancouver riot on the social media website Facebook have shed valuable insight into how 
individuals made sense of the riot in the days that followed, and justified their own acts of Internet 
vigilantism. Their research focused on, arguably, the largest and most popular Facebook group for 
posting photos and video evidence incriminating to rioters following the riot: A group named 
“Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos”. 12,587 user postings were made to the group’s primary 
wall in just 14 days following the riot, and the page received more than 70,000 “likes” in less than 
24 hours (Schneider & Trottier, 2012, 2013). Their findings, summarized briefly in the following 
sections, point to a number of motives underlying how and why individuals were motivated to 
engage in Internet vigilantism following the 2011 Vancouver riot, and provide guidance as to what 
steps may be taken to reduce instances of Internet vigilantism that threaten the safety and security 
of young offenders. 
 
Perception of Riot Participants as Inherently Deserving of Stigmatization 
 
Many of the hostile comments made by users to the group page stemmed from desires to denounce 
and ostracize those who participated in the riot, as well as to distance themselves from participants. 
The riot was largely blamed on the actions of “idiots” and “morons” who were not “true” hockey 
fans or Vancouverites, and suggestions were made that the rest of “us” (i.e., law-abiding 
responsible citizens of Vancouver and the world) should bring them to justice.  Many of these 
comments echoed those made by Chief Constable Chief Chu of the VPD who, in the days following 
the riot, claimed that those instigators among the mob were “criminals, anarchists, and thugs’ (Cole, 
2011). Although it has since been demonstrated that the vast majority of participants in the riot 
were first-time offenders (Arvanitidis, 2013), the construct of the rioters as “morons” and “bad 
apples”, fundamentally distinct from the good law-abiding citizens of Vancouver, appeared to have 















Perception of Riot Participants as Responsible for Own Online Stigmatization 
 
Many alleged rioters who were “named and shamed” within the group were blamed for their own 
ignorance of being filmed and photographed. These sentiments are indicative of not just attitudes 
towards those who participated in the riot, but of significant overall shifts in the degree to which 
social media users now perceive themselves to be at constant risk of being surveyed and reported 
to authorities by others. Consistent with this findings, a recent study on social media and visibility 
found that many respondents adopted several strategies to managing their social media profiles in 
order to avoid information leaks, ranging from limiting access to their information through tight 
privacy settings to self-censorship; they subsequently assumed that avoiding criminal charges was 
as simple as not “doing something stupid” (Trottier, 2012). 
 
Perception of Vigilantism as Providing Assistance to Justice Officials 
 
A number of user posts appeared to communicate the belief that “naming and shaming” alleged 
rioters was not only in line with the criminal justice system – that is, that doing so did not violate 
any existing laws prohibiting libel, threats, or harassment - but that such efforts actively assisted 
with the prosecution of rioters and the efforts of the IRIT. The VPD e-mail address was found to 
have been posted in the group over 140 times for users to forward pictures, videos, and names to, 
and several users outright claimed that police were actively asking people to join the group and 
“tag” individuals - that is, assign a name to a photograph of a person - if they recognized them (this 
claim that has never been verified). Still other user posts did not communicate a specific intent to 
assist in law enforcement efforts but nonetheless expressed a desire to see “punishment” and/or 
“justice” meted out to riot participants, suggesting that at least some of these individuals may have 
understood, on some level, that their acts of “naming and shaming” would have implications for 
the identification and apprehension of riot participants. 
 
Perception of Group as Necessary to Circumvent Formal Justice System 
 
In addition to those users who uploaded photos to the Facebook group in order to assist police in 
their prosecution efforts, some users who submitted evidence were motivated by a desire to 
circumvent the state-sanctioned justice system altogether. These individuals typically expressed 
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system, particularly for delays in prosecuting those 
responsible for the riot, but also for its perceived leniency. Some expressed particular 
dissatisfaction with the differential treatment that young offenders receive in the Canadian criminal 
justice system – and, in particular, perceived the YCJA as overly lenient and ineffective at 
punishing young offenders. It was also found that a number of users directly referred to both their 
actions, and the actions of others, as “vigilantism” (Schneider & Trottier, 2013, p. 353) - suggesting 
that for at least some of these users, participation in this group constituted a deliberate attempt to 
circumvent the criminal justice system in order to deliver, instead, a civilian-led form of justice. 
This finding is also consistent with the knowledge that vigilantes often justify their actions on the 
grounds that adequate legal mechanisms for criminal punishment are, in the given situation, either 
















Discussion and Recommendations 
 
The 2011 Vancouver riot saw social media and crowdsourced policing take “naming and shaming” 
to an unprecedented level that proved particularly threatening to the protection of young offenders’ 
identities. There is no question that the YCJA’s emphasis on the rehabilitation and reintegration of 
young offenders retains merit to this day; however, the myriad difficulties that social media creates 
in enforcing these provisions raise urgent questions regarding their applicability in this day and 
age, at least in their current form. Policing agencies typically lack the resources to effectively deal 
with cybercrime (Huey et al., 2013), and the long and complicated procedural process that awaits 
changes to the YCJA cannot keep up with the rapid pace at which social media technology evolves 
and changes. Innovative collaborative efforts, within and across various public and private sectors, 
may thus be the only feasible way to enforce the YCJA’s secrecy provisions today. From what is 
presently understood about why social media users “named and shamed” rioters following the 2011 
Vancouver riot, a number of alternative recommendations follow for how similar instances of 
“naming and shaming” may be minimized in the future.  
Social media platforms can inform users of the legal ramifications of their actions. As 
indicated by the belief that their actions were assisting police, many social media users who 
engaged in acts of vigilantism following the Vancouver riot may have been unaware that their 
actions were breaking any existing Canadian laws; indeed, it is likely that many Facebook users do 
not know enough about Canadian Law to even be aware of when they are breaking it, on account 
that many are young people themselves (Millar, 2008). Little effort has been devoted towards 
educating the general public about important Criminal Code and YCJA provisions, and social 
media platforms such as Facebook have made no significant effort to inform users of the legal 
ramifications of their actions. It would be beneficial for social media platforms to require users to 
familiarize themselves with the potential risks and harms associated with the publication and 
sharing of different kinds of information. 
Social media platforms can introduce mechanisms that discourage acts of “naming and 
shaming”. For example, if anonymity is assumed to be a key factor in enabling “naming and 
shaming” behaviours, then putting in place mechanisms which limit the extent to which social 
media users are able to post anonymously may see a decrease in this form of Internet vigilantism. 
American multinational corporation Google, for example, recently revamped the comments 
function on video-sharing website YouTube so that users now cannot comment unless they link 
their Google+ accounts, which require user profiles to correspond with users’ first and last names 
(Misener, 2013). It must be noted that these “real name” policies have not gone without criticism, 
with many noting that they are unaccommodating and discriminatory towards social media users 
who do not wish to reveal their legal identities online due to safety concerns (Holpuch, 2015); an 
alternate prevention strategy may thus be to simply increase the severity of penalties associated 
with online “naming and shaming” practices. Social media website reddit.com, for instance, 
recently had its policy updated to prohibit acts of harassment and “doxxing” (the publication of 
non-public personally-identifying information pertaining to an individual or individuals), under 
threat of being permanently banned from the website (Ore, 2015). 
Police can limit their reliance upon evidence-gathering strategies that encourage Internet 
vigilantism. Although the IRIT was not directly responsible for the actions of the Internet vigilantes 
who assisted them, Schneider and Trottier’s (2013) analysis suggest that the IRIT’s repeated 
requests for assistance from the public may have contributed to the fervor with which citizens then 













officials have a social responsibility to consider how untested tactics like “crowdsourced policing” 
may incite citizen-led acts of vigilantism. The finding that many social users believed they were 
supported in their efforts to mete out justice suggests an additional responsibility on the part of 
justice officials to inform would-be vigilantes of exactly what actions encompass “vigilantism”, 
particularly in the online realm; a brief statement on the Vancouver Police Department’s Riot 2011 
website1 asked only that citizens “resist the temptation to take justice into their own hands”, without 
specifying details as to what doing so would entail. 
Journalists can be attentive of language that supports “naming and shaming”. In the days 
that followed the 2011 Vancouver riot, news stories and editorials discussing the event were heavy 
with emotional language indicative of shame, anger, and embarrassment – all consistent with the 
shaming language observed within posts made to the “Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos” 
Facebook group (see Arvanitidis, 2013). This parallel is of note because the language used to 
describe criminal events, and criminal actors, has been found to have implications for how readers 
then come to understand these events: Specifically, the use of biased, negative language to describe 
criminal actors may be seen as informative of their inherent character traits, in line with the 
fundamental attribution error (see Dripps, 2003; Neapolitan, 1987). This begs the important 
question of whether these initial news reports lent legitimacy to the shaming practices that 
eventually gained traction within the “Vancouver Riot Pics” Facebook group. 
The 2011 Vancouver riot serves as a valuable case study in both the merits, and dangers, of 
what happens when social media users come to the aid of law enforcement officials. According to 
the Vancouver Police Department’s (2011) official Riot Review, the substantial number of arrests 
that police were able to make in the weeks following the riot was directly impacted by their efforts 
to “crowdsource” evidence, demonstrating that the general public can indeed be a significant 
partner to police agencies. The question that remains to be answered in this paper is whether these 
benefits outweigh the potentially devastating consequences of “naming and shaming” that young 
offenders may find themselves facing with much greater frequency, should such practices come to 
find mainstream acceptance. A criminal justice system that claims to value the rehabilitative 
potential of young people cannot, in good conscience, answer “yes” to this question. Without a 
clear answer as to whether the YCJA’s secrecy provisions are relevant today, what must not be 
forgotten by researchers and policy-makers alike is that vigilantism arises, first and foremost, from 
a perceived need for justice – the perception that the criminal justice system is not working (Juliano, 
2011). If current legal insufficiencies cannot stop social media users from taking the law into their 
own hands, our only alternative is to continue to increase our understanding of why individuals 
break laws prohibiting publication bans in the first place, and locate innovative substitutions along 
the way. 
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